Mark  Morgenfruh v. Larson Design Group Inc by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-9-2020 
Mark Morgenfruh v. Larson Design Group Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Mark Morgenfruh v. Larson Design Group Inc" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 851. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/851 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
 
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
____________ 
 
No. 19-3261 
____________ 
 
 
MARK MORGENFRUH, 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
LARSON DESIGN GROUP, INC. 
      
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 4-18-cv-00021) 
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 9, 2020 
 
Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and MATEY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 9, 2020) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Larson Design Group, Inc. terminated Mark Morgenfruh’s employment, and he 
sued for disability discrimination and interference with his medical leave. The District 
Court granted Larson summary judgment, and Morgenfruh now appeals. We will affirm. 
I 
 In 2013, Larson hired Morgenfruh as its Director of Human Resources and 
promoted him to Vice President. By 2016, Morgenfruh was diagnosed with a number of 
illnesses,1 and his health kept declining.2 On June 27, 2017, Larson’s Chief Executive 
Officer Keith Kuzio wrote a memorandum to Morgenfruh’s personnel file detailing 
several reasons he had decided to terminate Morgenfruh. Three days later, Kuzio met 
with Morgenfruh to explain his decision. Morgenfruh wanted an explanation, and Kuzio 
gave two reasons from the memo he wrote: succession planning and director 
development. When Morgenfruh pressed for other reasons, Kuzio replied: “[I]t’s just not 
worth getting into right now.” App. 554. 
 
 1 These included degenerative disc disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
gastroesophageal reflux disease, hypertension or high blood pressure and high 
cholesterol, and irritable bowel syndrome. 
 
 2 After 2016, Morgenfruh was diagnosed with Type II diabetes, benign prostatic 
hyperplasia, and sleep apnea. 
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 Morgenfruh sued Larson in the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania, claiming discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), and interference with his 
right to medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The District 
Court granted Larson summary judgment, Morgenfruh v. Larson Design Grp., Inc., 2019 
WL 4511711, at *1 (M.D. Pa. 2019), and Morgenfruh appealed. 
II3 
 The District Court did not err. As to the disability discrimination claims,4 the 
Court reasoned Morgenfruh could not show the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons 
Larson gave for his termination were pretextual. See id. at *4; see also McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). On appeal, Morgenfruh explains 
Kuzio told him not to work on succession planning, and he finished the director 
development program just days before his termination. Morgenfruh also notes that Kuzio 
delayed his termination until he finished tasks that were critical to “enhancing 
engagement, trust, teamwork, to move the organization forward.” Opening Br. at 21 
 
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a). We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s summary 
judgment de novo. Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 
4 Claims under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with ADA claims. See 
Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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(quotations omitted). Whatever the merit of these arguments, Morgenfruh did not present 
them to the District Court, so they are forfeited on appeal. See In Re: J & S Props., LLC, 
872 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 
 Morgenfruh also argues he can show pretext because Larson’s answers to 
interrogatories gave more reasons for his termination than Kuzio mentioned at the time 
he terminated Morgenfruh. Opening Br. at 18–20 (citing Dennis v. Columbia Colleton 
Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 646 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiff showed pretext 
where an employer offered more reasons at trial than in discovery)). The District Court 
rejected this argument because “providing additional reasons is not the same as providing 
inconsistent reasons.” Morgenfruh, 2019 WL 4511711, at *4. We need not reach that 
issue, however, because Larson did not “add” reasons between the in-person meeting and 
discovery: Kuzio’s memo—dated three days before the meeting—lists the reasons Larson 
gave in its interrogatory answers. 
 Finally, as to the FMLA claim, the District Court held Larson’s failure to advise 
Morgenfruh of his right to medical leave did not prejudice him because “he was familiar 
with the FMLA through his position as the head of Larson’s human resources 
department.” Morgenfruh, 2019 WL 4511711, at *6; see also Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. 
Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (an employee must show employer’s 
“failure to advise rendered him unable to exercise [his] right [to leave] in a meaningful 
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way, thereby causing injury”). On appeal, Morgenfruh insists “he would have taken leave 
to attend medically necessary appointments and treatment” had Larson informed him of 
his right to FMLA leave. Opening Br. 15. That argument strains credulity.  
Morgenfruh testified that before working at Larson, he took seminars or 
coursework in FMLA administration, personally administered the FMLA, and supervised 
people who did so. He also testified that when he worked at Larson: no one outside of HR 
had any greater knowledge about the FMLA than he did; he headed the department 
responsible for administering the FMLA; he was familiar with the forms Larson used to 
administer the FMLA; he had chosen a flexible work schedule over FMLA leave in the 
past; he knew his subordinate was trained in FMLA administration; and he advised 
Larson on the merits of other employees’ FMLA claims. Given Morgenfruh’s own 
testimony, no reasonable jury could conclude Larson’s failure to advise him of his rights 
under the FMLA prejudiced him. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986). Morgenfruh knew about FMLA leave. If he wanted it, he would have taken it. 
* * * 
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment. 
